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I.

INTRODUCTION
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This matter comes on before this court on an appeal from
orders the District Court 1 entered on November 10, 2010,
denying appellant Gray Holdco, Inc.’s (Gray) Motion to Stay
Proceedings in the District Court pending the outcome of a
separate arbitration proceeding of its claims against appellee
Randy Cassady (Cassady) and granting Cassady’s Motion to
Enjoin the same arbitration proceedings. Gray made the
arbitration demand more than ten months after it initiated this
civil suit in the District Court on November 13, 2009, alleging
that Cassady breached the employment contract between him
and Gray and that Cassady and a new business venture that he
established, RWLS, were interfering with Gray’s contractual
relationships. 2 On September 17, 2010, Gray, pursuant to an
arbitration provision in an agreement between it and Cassady,
filed the demand to arbitrate its claims against Cassady with the
American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) in Delaware and
filed the Motion to Stay the Proceedings against Cassady in the
District Court. 3 Cassady opposed the Motion to Stay and filed
1

A magistrate judge entered all the District Court orders that we
discuss in this opinion inasmuch as the parties consented to
proceed before a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(i).
2

In certain portions of the record and in appellant’s brief
“RWLS” sometimes is referred to as “Renegade.”

3

RWLS is not a party to the arbitration agreement and it and
Cassady were distinct parties represented by different attorneys
in the District Court. Moreover, Cassady’s attorneys filed an
appellee’s brief on this appeal only on behalf of Cassady, and,
although RWLS’s attorneys have filed an appearance on the
4

the Motion to Enjoin the arbitration proceedings arguing that
Gray, through its initiation and pursuit of this litigation in the
District Court, waived the right to enforce the arbitration
agreement. Inasmuch as we agree with the District Court that
Gray waived its right to enforce the arbitration agreement, we
will affirm the Court’s orders.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In June 2006, Cassady began work for Gray’s second-tier
operating subsidiary, Gray Wireline Service, Inc. (Gray
Wireline), a cased-hole wireline business, as a manager of its
facility in Granbury, Texas. Gray alleges that, as part of
Cassady’s employment agreement with Gray Wireline, he
agreed to an “Option Agreement” with “certain restrictive
covenants” which prohibited him from: (1) misusing Gray
Wireline’s confidential information; (2) engaging in business
while still an employee of Gray Wireline; (3) competing with
Gray Wireline for two years after the end of his employment
with Gray Wireline; and (4) soliciting Gray Wireline employees
for one year following the end of his employment relationship
with Gray Wireline. App. at 74-77. Gray Wireline also alleges
that an additional agreement between Gray and Cassady, entitled
the 2006 New Hire Stock Option Plan, contains the following
arbitration provision:
SECTION 13. ARBITRATION. Any dispute or
appeal, RWLS is not participating in this appeal.
5

controversy between the Company and a
Participant, arising out of or relating to this Plan
or the Participant’s Option Agreement, the breach
of this Plan or the Participant’s Option
Agreement, or otherwise, shall be settled by
arbitration in Wilmington, Delaware administered
by the American Arbitration Association in
accordance with its Commercial Rules then in
effect and judgment on the award rendered by the
arbitrator may be entered in any court having
jurisdiction thereof. . . . [E]ither party may,
without inconsistency with this arbitration
provision, apply to any court having jurisdiction
over such dispute or controversy and seek interim
provisional, injunctive or other equitable relief
until the arbitration award is rendered or the
controversy is otherwise resolved.
Id. at 70-71. 4
In March 2009, Gray Wireline promoted Cassady to
4

We recognize that Cassady denies that the 2006 New Hire
Stock Option Plan ever was enforceable against him, though we
do not address that contention. We also note that the parties on
this appeal make no distinction between Gray and Gray Wireline
with respect either to the entity employing Cassady or to the
party to their agreements with Cassady and thus, in effect, they
treat Gray and Gray Wireline as a single entity. In these
circumstances, we similarly are treating Gray and Gray Wireline
as a single entity, as, indeed, did the District Court.
6

District Manager of its facility in New Kensington,
Pennsylvania, and in July 2009, Cassady rose to the position of
Region Manager of Gray Wireline’s operations in Pennsylvania,
Louisiana, and Mississippi. According to Gray, on September
21, 2009, Cassady resigned his position at Gray Wireline and
formed RWLS, an entity that competed with Gray in the casedhole wireline business. Gray also alleges that Cassady solicited
multiple Gray Wireline employees to join RWLS and solicited
Gray Wireline customers to transfer their business to RWLS.
On November 13, 2009, Gray filed the complaint in this
action in the District Court against Cassady and RWLS,
asserting that Cassady breached the Option Agreement and
tortiously interfered with Gray’s existing contractual
relationships. The complaint also asserted claims of unjust
enrichment and civil conspiracy based on Cassady and RWLS’s
solicitation of Gray clients and employees. The complaint
primarily requested injunctive relief although it also sought
money damages. Significantly, the complaint did not mention
the arbitration agreement in the New Hire Stock Option Plan or
include any arbitration clause in the employment agreement
labeled as “Exhibit A” which Gray attached to the complaint.
On the same day that Gray filed the complaint, it filed a motion
for a preliminary injunction against both defendants, requesting
that the Court enjoin them from, among other things, soliciting
Gray’s customers and employees.
On November 17, 2009, Gray filed a motion for
expedited discovery which the District Court granted the next
day. An attorney representing RWLS filed an appearance in the
7

District Court on November 20, 2009, and a separate attorney
representing Cassady filed an appearance on November 25,
2009. Cassady and RWLS then filed a joint motion opposing
expedited discovery. On December 4, 2009, the Court
conducted a discovery conference during which the parties
agreed to a discovery schedule and the Court set the dates for
hearing the application for a preliminary injunction as January
12-13, 2010.
The parties intensely litigated the preliminary injunction
proceedings. In the discovery Gray served 15 requests for the
production of documents and 11 interrogatories and deposed
Cassady and a corporate representative of RWLS. Cassady
propounded 118 requests for production of documents and
RWLS propounded 15 requests for production of documents, 7
requests for admissions, and 13 interrogatories. The District
Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the preliminary
injunction application and on January 13, 2010, following the
conclusion of the hearing, the Court filed an opinion setting
forth its conclusion that Gray did not meet its burden to establish
that it was entitled to injunctive relief under Federal Rule Civil
Procedure 65. In its conclusion, the Court, inter alia, held “as a
matter of law, that the agreement entered into between Cassady
and the plaintiff is not enforceable” and that “the plaintiff has
not demonstrated that it will likely succeed on the merits.” Gray
Holdco, Inc. v. Cassady, Civ. No. 2:09-cv-1519, 2010 WL
235106, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2010) (Gray I). Consequently,
the Court denied Gray’s motion for a preliminary injunction.
On March 2, 2010, the parties filed a Federal Rule Civil
Procedure 26(f) discovery report and a proposed discovery plan.
8

On March 9, 2010, the District Court conducted a status
conference and set deadlines for mediation and for filing
motions for judgment on the pleadings. On March 19, 2010,
Cassady and RWLS separately moved for judgment on the
pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) or, in the alternative,
to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), with
Cassady asserting that the Court’s findings at the preliminary
injunction hearing were “law of the case” and barred Gray’s
claims as a matter of law and RWLS asserting that Gray did not
suffer any damage as a result of Cassady’s alleged contract
breach. As a matter of convenience we will refer to the motions
simply as motions to dismiss. Gray filed a brief opposing the
motions to dismiss. On June 8, 2010, the Court held another
status conference and established discovery deadlines and on
June 30, 2010, the Court denied Cassady’s and RWLS’s motions
to dismiss.
On September 17, 2010, after obtaining a new attorney,
Gray filed a demand for arbitration against Cassady with the
AAA in Delaware. Gray based the demand on the arbitration
clause included in the New Hire Stock Option Plan that we
already have quoted. Then, on September 21, 2010, Cassady
filed a motion in the District Court to enjoin the arbitration and
to impose sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. In the motion,
Cassady argued that Gray waived its right to arbitrate by
participating in substantial litigation and discovery in the
District Court and by acting inconsistently with its later action
seeking to enforce its right to arbitrate. The following day Gray
filed a motion pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9
U.S.C. § 1 et seq., in the District Court to stay the judicial
proceedings as to Cassady pending the outcome of the Delaware
9

arbitration. Gray argued that the arbitration agreement was
mutual and enforceable and that Cassady could not demonstrate
the necessary prejudice arising from Gray’s participation in the
litigation to justify the Court to hold that it waived its right to
arbitrate. Cassady opposed the motion and renewed its
argument that Gray waived its right to enforce the arbitration
provision and also contended that the provision was not
enforceable against him.
The District Court granted Cassady’s motion to enjoin the
arbitration and denied Gray’s motion to stay the proceedings
pending arbitration. It did not, however, impose sanctions
against Gray. In its opinion accompanying its orders, the Court
determined that three of the six non-exclusive factors we
outlined in Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912
(3d Cir. 1992), for determining whether a party has waived its
right to arbitrate weighed in favor of finding waiver, one factor
weighed against finding waiver, and two factors were neutral.
Gray Holdco, Inc. v. Cassady, Civ. No. 2:09-cv-1519, 2010 WL
4687744, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2010) (Gray II). Inasmuch
as the Court found that Gray waived its right to enforce the
arbitration provision, it did not decide whether in the absence of
the waiver the arbitration provision would have been
enforceable. Gray filed a notice of appeal challenging the
Court’s denial of its request for a stay and granting Cassady’s
request to enjoin the arbitration proceedings.

III.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

10

The District Court had jurisdiction over this diversity of
citizenship action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Although,
generally, with exceptions not applicable here, we only have
jurisdiction to hear appeals from district courts’ final orders, we
have jurisdiction in this case under the FAA to hear an appeal
from the District Court’s order denying a request to stay the
proceedings pending arbitration and granting Cassady’s request
to enjoin the arbitration proceedings. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(2);
Zimmer v. CooperNeff Advisors, Inc., 523 F.3d 224, 228 (3d
Cir. 2008) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)).
We exercise plenary review over both “questions of law
concerning the applicability and scope of arbitration
agreements” and whether a party “through its litigation conduct,
waived its right to compel arbitration.” Nino v. Jewelry Exch.,
Inc., 609 F.3d 191, 200 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). To the extent that a district court makes
factual findings in making these determinations, we review its
findings for clear error. Id.

IV.

DISCUSSION

The FAA provides that:
A written provision in any . . . contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
11

law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2. The Supreme Court has stated that this provision
reflects a “‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.’” AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011)
(quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 941 (1983)). Thus “any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is
the construction of the contract language itself or any allegation
of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” Moses H.
Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25, 103 S.Ct. at 941; see also Volt Info.
Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 476, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 1254 (1989) (“There is no
federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of
procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the
enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to
arbitrate.”). Given this strong preference to enforce private
arbitration agreements, we will not infer lightly that a party has
waived its right to arbitrate and we will find that a party has
waived the right “only where the demand for arbitration came
long after the suit commenced and when both parties had
engaged in extensive discovery.” PaineWebber Inc. v. Faragalli,
61 F.3d 1063, 1068-69 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
We also have held that a party seeking arbitration may
waive its right to arbitration when the party opposing the
arbitration demonstrates sufficient prejudice arising from the
delay of the party seeking arbitration in making its demand.
Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 223 (3d Cir.
12

2007). To that end, in Hoxworth we identified six nonexclusive factors to guide the prejudice inquiry: (1) timeliness or
lack thereof of the motion to arbitrate; (2) extent to which the
party seeking arbitration has contested the merits of the
opposing party’s claims; (3) whether the party seeking
arbitration informed its adversary of its intent to pursue
arbitration prior to seeking to enjoin the court proceedings; (4)
the extent to which a party seeking arbitration engaged in nonmerits motion practice; (5) the party’s acquiescence to the
court’s pretrial orders; and (6) the extent to which the parties
have engaged in discovery. Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 926-27.
While these factors generally are indicative of whether a party
opposing arbitration would suffer prejudice attributable to the
other party’s delay in seeking arbitration, the answer to the
question of whether a party invoking the arbitration clause
waived its right to arbitrate is necessarily case specific and thus
depends on the circumstances and context of each case. Nino,
609 F.3d at 209.
The District Court determined that in a Hoxworth
analysis the first and last factors were neutral, the fourth factor
weighed against finding waiver and the remaining three factors
weighed in favor of finding a waiver. We will consider each
factor separately but first we will consider Gray’s overarching
argument that we should not factor its conduct in pursuing
litigation seeking a preliminary injunction into our Hoxworth
prejudice analysis. We point out that our weighing of the
Hoxworth factors involves an analysis that goes beyond merely
counting the factors for or against finding a waiver.
A.

“No Waiver” Clause
13

The arbitration agreement on which Gray relies contains
a disclaimer that “either party may, without inconsistency with
this arbitration provision, apply to any court having jurisdiction
over such dispute or controversy and seek interim provisional,
injunctive or other equitable relief until the arbitration award is
rendered or the controversy is otherwise resolved.” App. at 71.
Gray argues that this provision precluded the District Court from
considering its actions in pursuing litigation seeking a
preliminary injunction in its analysis of the Hoxworth factors.
The District Court disagreed and held that while Gray’s pursuit
of injunctive relief did not waive its right to arbitrate, neither did
the “no waiver” clause act as a shield against a possible finding
that Gray waived that right. Gray II, 2010 WL 4687744, at *3. 5
Gray contends that the District Court, by factoring the
preliminary injunction proceedings into its Hoxworth waiver
analysis, refused to enforce Gray’s agreement with Cassady
insofar as that agreement allowed Gray to apply for injunctive
relief without waiving its right to arbitration.
We agree with the District Court that the clause in the
New Hire Stock Option Plan allowing either party to seek
injunctive relief until the arbitration award is rendered does not
override the applicability of the Hoxworth multipart analysis
which examines whether a party, by its participation in
litigation, has waived its right to invoke arbitration. Thus, we
5

Cassady disputes the characterization of the clause in the New
Hire Stock Option Plan as a “no waiver” clause. We, however,
do not find its characterization significant as we are concerned
with the content of the clause rather than its characterization.
14

also agree with the holding in S & R Co. of Kingston v. Latona
Trucking, Inc., 159 F.3d 80, 86 (2d Cir. 1998), “that the
presence of a ‘no waiver’ clause does not alter the ordinary
analysis undertaken to determine if a party has waived its right
to arbitration.”
Gray distinguishes Latona Trucking by first arguing that
the court in that case interpreted a “no waiver” clause6 to allow a
party seeking arbitration “to seek provisional remedies or other
judicial proceedings that would not function to displace
arbitration on the underlying dispute.” Appellant’s br. at 19
(quoting Latona Trucking, 159 F.3d at 85). Gray then argues
that inasmuch as the appellant in Latona Trucking had not
sought a preliminary injunction, which Gray categorizes as
provisional relief, “the holding of Latona Trucking does not
support the district court’s conclusion that it could construct a
finding of waiver based on Gray’s efforts to secure a preliminary
injunction.” Id. Gray also argues that the District Court’s
decision to take its pursuit of a preliminary injunction into
consideration in its waiver analysis was inconsistent with our
opinion in Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 882 F.2d
806 (3d Cir. 1989).
In Ortho Pharmaceutical we indicated “that a district
court has the authority to grant injunctive relief in an arbitrable
6

The “no waiver” clause in Latona Trucking was an AAA rule
incorporated into the parties’ contract stating that: “No judicial
proceeding by a party relating to the subject matter of the
arbitration shall be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to
arbitrate.” Latona Trucking, 159 F.3d at 85.
15

dispute, provided that the traditional prerequisites for such relief
are satisfied.” Id. at 812. Yet we only were holding that a
district court’s action in exercising its equitable powers to grant
a preliminary injunction was not inconsistent with the FAA and
that a party does not waive its right to seek a preliminary
injunction by entering into an arbitration agreement. Id. We did
not address the distinct question of whether a party’s conduct in
pursuit of the preliminary injunction may establish prejudice in
the context of an arbitration waiver inquiry. Moreover, while
Latona Trucking did not involve a preliminary injunction, its
rationale is applicable to this case: a party should not be allowed
to delay its demand for arbitration and use federal court
proceedings to “‘test[] the water before taking [a] swim.’” 159
F.3d at 86 (quoting Home Gas Corp. of Mass., Inc. v. Walter’s
of Hadley, Inc., 532 N.E.2d 681, 685 (Ma. 1989)) (first
alteration in original). In other words, “the fact that an
arbitration agreement incorporates [a no waiver clause] would
not prevent a court from finding that a party has waived
arbitration by actively participating in protracted litigation of an
arbitrable dispute.” Id. at 85.
We disagree with Gray’s argument that the District
Court, through its consideration of the proceedings on the
preliminary injunction application in its Hoxworth analysis,
nullified the contractual provision allowing either party, without
inconsistency with the arbitration provision, to pursue injunctive
relief. To the contrary, the Court specifically recognized Gray’s
contractual right to apply for injunctive relief and honored that
provision by not weighing its participation in discovery related
to the application in determining whether Gray waived the right
to arbitration. Gray II, 2010 WL 4687744, at *4.
16

Nevertheless, like the District Court, we think that the
contractual no waiver provision does not require a court to
disregard completely Gray’s conduct in pursuit of the
preliminary injunction. Adopting Gray’s position that any
conduct in pursuit of a preliminary injunction is exempt from a
prejudice inquiry could allow a party, under the guise of seeking
a preliminary injunction, to conduct discovery which would not
be allowed in arbitration proceedings. See, e.g., Zwitserse
Maatschappij Van Levensverzekering En Lijfrente v. ABN Int’l
Capital Mkts. Corp., 996 F.2d 1478, 1480 (2d Cir. 1993) (per
curiam) (holding that taking deposition of witnesses not
available in arbitration proceedings is sufficient prejudice to find
waiver of right to arbitrate); St. Mary’s Med. Ctr. of Evansville,
Inc. v. Disco Aluminum Prods. Co., 969 F.2d 585, 591 (7th Cir.
1992) (“By delaying its demand for arbitration, Disco was able
to obtain discovery it would not necessarily have been entitled to
in an arbitration proceeding.”). 7
More fundamentally, in addition to addressing the
important question of whether the non-moving party suffers
prejudice from the moving party’s delay in invoking an
arbitration clause, a court, by finding that there has been a
waiver of the right to arbitrate predicated on a party’s litigation
conduct, effectuates the principle that a party may not use
arbitration to manipulate the legal process and in that process
waste scarce judicial resources. See, e.g., Republic Ins. Co. v.
7

As Gray points out, Cassady does not claim that he was
prejudiced in this manner. However, the cases above
demonstrate why we will not adopt the position which Gray
advocates.
17

PAICO Receivables, LLC, 383 F.3d 341, 348 (5th Cir. 2004)
(holding that a “no waiver” clause does not override district
court’s inherent authority to control its own docket and to find
that a party, through extensive litigation, has waived its right to
arbitrate); Nat’l Found. for Cancer Research v. A. G. Edwards &
Sons, Inc., 821 F.2d 772, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“To give
Edwards a second bite at the very questions presented to the
court for disposition squarely confronts the policy that
arbitration may not be used as a strategy to manipulate the legal
process.”). For example, if faced with a contract that stated that
neither party implicitly would waive the right to arbitrate by
engaging in extensive litigation inconsistent with that right a
court would not need to dispense completely with a prejudice
inquiry in analyzing whether one of the parties, through its
pursuit of litigation, did, indeed, waive the right to arbitration.
See Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 39:36 (4th ed.
2000) (“The general view is that a party to a written contract can
waive a provision of that contract by conduct expressly or
surrounding performance, despite the existence of a so-called
anti-waiver or ‘failure to enforce’ clause in the contract.”).
Therefore, while Gray’s motion for a preliminary
injunction in itself does not factor into the waiver inquiry, the
question for purposes of finding an arbitration waiver remains
whether Gray, through its litigation conduct, waived its right to
compel arbitration because of the prejudice Cassady suffered
attributable to Gray’s delay in invoking its right to arbitrate. See
Nino, 609 F.3d at 209. In answering that question, we find that
it is appropriate to consider Gray’s litigation conduct as a whole,
including its conduct in its pursuit of a preliminary injunction.

18

B.

Timeliness

Gray filed its complaint and motion for preliminary
injunctive relief against Cassady in the District Court on
November 13, 2009, but did not file its demand for arbitration
with the AAA until September 17, 2010. Though, at least
insofar as we are aware, Gray did not explain to the District
Court its reason for the delay, the Court nevertheless held that
Gray’s ten-month delay, while “questionable,” neither weighed
in favor of nor against finding that Gray waived its right to
arbitrate. Gray II, 2010 WL 4687744, at *3. Gray argues that
the District Court nevertheless erroneously counted the time it
spent litigating the preliminary injunction against it and ignored
the fact that the parties did not actively pursue the litigation
following the preliminary injunction hearing. 8
In considering the timeliness question we first reject
Gray’s contention that the Court should have disregarded the
time that Gray was seeking a preliminary injunction. In this
regard, we point out that there was no reason why Gray could
not have demanded arbitration while it was seeking the
preliminary injunction as there is no rule precluding a party from
simultaneously traveling on both procedural avenues. Indeed,
Gray does not suggest that it could not have sought a
preliminary injunction and demanded arbitration in parallel
proceedings.

8

As we discuss below, we do not agree with Gray’s contention
that, after the preliminary injunction hearing, the parties were
not engaged actively in litigation.
19

In any event, while we agree with the District Court that
the ten-month period between Gray’s initiation of the lawsuit in
the District Court and its initiation of arbitration with the AAA
is not, standing alone, outcome determinative on the waiver
issue here, see Zimmer 523 F.3d at 232, the ten-month delay is
substantially longer than the delays we have encountered in
cases where we have not found a waiver of the right to arbitrate
on a delay basis. See Palcko v. Airborne Express, Inc., 372 F.3d
588, 598 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that 38-day delay, while not
determinative, did not establish waiver where opponent of
arbitration had not demonstrated prejudice); Wood v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 207 F.3d 674, 680 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that short
delay of one-and-a-half months and lack of significant steps in
litigation that could have caused prejudice to plaintiff counseled
against finding waiver); Faragalli, 61 F.3d at 1069 (waiver not
found after two-month delay with no showing of prejudice);
Gavlik Constr. Co. v. H. F. Campbell Co., 526 F.2d 777, 783-84
(3d Cir. 1975) (holding that defendant did not waive right to
arbitrate where it moved for stay pending arbitration
immediately after removing case to federal court).
The foregoing cases should be contrasted to cases in
which, after a party delayed seeking arbitration, we have found
that it waived its right to arbitrate. These cases in which we
found a waiver featured delays which were closer to ten months,
the period of delay here. Thus, in Hoxworth itself we found a
waiver following a more than 11-month delay where the party
seeking the finding that there had been a waiver participated in
numerous pretrial proceedings and engaged in extensive
discovery. 980 F.2d at 925-27. And in Nino we found that a
15-month delay weighed in favor of a finding of waiver. 609
20

F.3d at 210. Thus, in Nino we found that the first Hoxworth
factor weighed in favor of finding that there was a waiver where
the delay was significant and the explanations for its delay by
the party seeking arbitration were unpersuasive. Id. It is
significant that, at least to the best of our knowledge, Gray
offered no explanation to the District Court for its delay in
waiting ten months after filing suit in the District Court before
seeking enforcement of the arbitration provision and that it
certainly has not offered such an explanation on this appeal. 9
Overall, we are satisfied that while the length of the time
between when a party initiates or first participates in litigation
and when it seeks to enforce an arbitration clause is not
dispositive in a waiver inquiry, in this case this factor weighs in
favor of finding waiver.
9

In his answering brief Cassady suggests that the explanation
for Gray’s delay is that Gray made a “tactical decision” to seek
arbitration after it failed in its attempt to secure preliminary
injunctive relief and then switched attorneys. Appellee’s br. at
27. Though it had the opportunity to do so when it filed its reply
brief, Gray has not contended that Cassady’s explanation was
incorrect. Even though we will not speculate on why Gray
waited ten months after filing this litigation to demand
arbitration of its dispute with Cassady, we cannot help but note
that it appears that Gray’s complaint was significantly weakened
after the District Court held in denying the preliminary
injunction application that “as a matter of law . . . the agreement
entered into between Cassady and the plaintiff is not
enforceable.” Gray I, 2010 WL 235106, at *5. This point could
not have been lost on Gray.
21

C.

Gray’s contesting of Cassady’s claims

The second Hoxworth factor is the degree to which the
party seeking to compel arbitration has contested the merits of
its opponent’s claims. The wording of this factor as usually set
forth suggests that the factor is immaterial in this case because
Cassady has not filed any counterclaims against Gray and thus
there was no litigation in which Gray would have had reason to
contest any claim against it. In Hoxworth we formulated this
factor in the way we did because in Hoxworth, as in most cases
in which there is an arbitration demand after the initiation of
litigation, the defendant invokes an arbitration provision after
the plaintiff files the court action. See, e.g., Gavlik, 526 F.2d at
780. But this case is unusual because Gray both initiated this
litigation and, more than ten months later, invoked the right to
arbitrate the claims it already had advanced judicially.
Nevertheless, we agree with the District Court that a literal
reading of this factor would support Gray’s attempt to avoid
scrutiny of its litigation activity in a Hoxworth analysis.
Accordingly, to make the factor germane here, we, like the
District Court, will apply this factor by examining the degree to
which Gray participated in substantive legal proceedings and
“has pursued or challenged the legal positions and arguments
advanced by the respective parties [in this litigation].” Gray II,
2010 WL 4687744, at *3.
The District Court held that this factor weighed strongly
in favor of waiver inasmuch as Gray “participated in
considerable legal action, no matter its context, related to the
substantive merits of the underlying lawsuit.” Id. Specifically,
the Court pointed to the fact that in pursuit of a preliminary
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injunction motion Gray called four witnesses, cross-examined
five witnesses, and introduced numerous exhibits into evidence.
Moreover, the Court noted that Gray filed briefs opposing
Cassady’s and RWLS’s motions to dismiss. 10 Gray argues that
the District Court erred because it considered Gray’s conduct
during the preliminary injunction proceedings, and because it
erroneously considered its defense against Cassady’s motion to
dismiss Gray’s allegations.
Gray first argues that the District Court’s consideration of
its pursuit of a preliminary injunction will “eviscerate” our
holding in Ortho Pharmaceutical because every preliminary
injunction proceeding necessarily entails an inquiry into whether
a “movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the
merits.” Appellant’s br. at 25 (citing Am. Civil Liberties Union
v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 247 (3d Cir. 2003) (identifying
probability of success on merits as requirement to obtaining
preliminary injunction)). This argument is without force for in a
preliminary injunction proceeding a district court analyzes a
movant’s likelihood of success on the merits of its claims
without affecting the movant’s ability later to arbitrate those
claims if the movant files its motion for a preliminary injunction
when it already has sought to arbitrate the dispute. Indeed, this
was the exact scenario we addressed in Ortho Pharmaceutical,
882 F.2d at 809. Even where the party moving for a preliminary
injunction does so before filing for arbitration, it can avoid
waiving its right to arbitrate by notifying the opposing party of
10

Of course, Gray’s opposition to RWLS’s motion is immaterial
inasmuch as the Gray-RWLS dispute was not subject to
arbitration.
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its intent to invoke arbitration in the future. Here, Gray did
neither, and thus the District Court did not err in considering
Gray’s conduct during the proceedings on its preliminary
injunction application in analyzing the second Hoxworth factor.
The District Court also properly considered Gray’s
opposition to Cassady’s motion to dismiss in the waiver
analysis. Gray argues that this Hoxworth factor should not
apply to a moving party’s defense against a motion to dismiss
because it is intended to prevent a movant from getting a second
bite at the apple by filing a motion to dismiss and then filing a
motion to compel arbitration if the motion to dismiss is not
successful. Of course, it is ironical that Gray makes this twobite argument because here it is Gray that is seeking a second
bite by seeking arbitration after it failed in its attempt to secure a
preliminary injunction. In that regard, we note that when it
sought arbitration Gray knew that the District Court already had
held “as a matter of law, that the agreement entered into
between Cassady and the plaintiff is not enforceable.” Gray I,
2010 WL 235106, at *5. Thus it is not difficult to find prejudice
where a party, such as Gray, is allowed to test out the merits of
its case in a preliminary injunction application but then resorts to
arbitration when it becomes apparent that the court regards its
case as standing on weak footing. In any event, as we stated in
Nino, the focus of this factor is whether a party engaged “in
motion practice on the merits prior to moving to compel
arbitration.” Nino, 609 F.3d at 210-11. By responding to
Cassady’s motion to dismiss, Gray undoubtedly engaged in
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motion practice on the merits of the dispute. 11
Therefore, like the District Court, we find that this factor
weighs in favor of finding waiver.
D.

Gray’s Late Notification to Cassady of Its Intent to
Arbitrate

The third factor in the Hoxworth balancing test asks
whether Gray informed Cassady of its intent to seek arbitration
before it filed its motion to stay the District Court proceedings.
980 F.2d at 926-27. The Court held that this factor weighed
heavily in favor of finding waiver inasmuch as Gray notified
Cassady of its intent to arbitrate on September 17, 2010, the
same day that it filed its demand for arbitration with the AAA.
Gray acknowledges that it did not provide Cassady with earlier
notice of its intent to arbitrate but argues that this factor should
be neutral because Cassady has not shown that it suffered any
prejudice from Gray’s failure to provide earlier notice.

11

We point out that one might have expected that Gray would
have moved to compel arbitration as soon as Cassady filed his
motion to dismiss if Gray had an intent at that time to seek
arbitration later. After all, if Gray had that intent at the time
Cassady filed the motion to dismiss it would seem that it would
have been almost reckless for it not to have demanded
arbitration when it received the motion because if the District
Court granted the motion and Gray later demanded arbitration
Cassady undoubtedly would have raised the preclusive effect of
the Court’s order in the arbitration proceedings.
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We reject Gray’s argument that Cassady has not suffered
any prejudice due to Gray’s failure to provide notice of its intent
to arbitrate in this case. In the arbitration waiver context we
have recognized two distinct types of prejudice: substantive
legal prejudice and prejudice a party suffers due to the
unnecessary delay and expense of having to litigate a case that
an arbitrator later decides. See Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 224. A
showing of either type of prejudice is sufficient for a party
objecting to arbitration to prevail in the waiver inquiry. Id.
Gray argues that the case was dormant and “there was
literally no activity going on” for much of the ten months
between Gray’s initiation of the proceedings in the District
Court and its demand for arbitration. Appellant’s br. at 27.
However, we have stated that “a party’s capacity to develop a
litigation strategy with regard to the likelihood of arbitration
diminishes the longer the case is litigated with no . . . indication
that a motion to compel arbitration is forthcoming.” Nino, 609
F.3d at 211. In Nino, we held that even though the party seeking
arbitration included mandatory arbitration as one of the ten
affirmative defenses in its answer to the plaintiff’s complaint,
the third Hoxworth factor weighed in favor of finding a waiver
of the right to arbitrate because the significance of the notice
diminished the longer the defendant delayed in moving to
compel arbitration. Id. at 211-12. Specifically, we stated that
notice of arbitration could change a party’s approach to
discovery as well as its litigation strategy based on whether it
could recover attorney’s fees. Id. at 211.
Between the time the District Court denied preliminary
injunctive relief and Gray filed its notice of arbitration, Cassady
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filed a motion to dismiss, 12 the parties set a discovery schedule
and submitted a Rule 26(f) discovery plan, the District Court
held status conferences, and the parties participated in
mandatory mediation. Cassady argues that during these
proceedings, it conducted its defense preparation “with the
understanding and reasonable expectation . . . that the parties’
entire dispute would be resolved by a jury in a single trial
conducted in the District Court.” 13 Appellees’ br. at 39.
Therefore, Gray’s failure to notify Cassady of its intent to seek
arbitration substantively has prejudiced Cassady’s approach to
this case.
In addition to substantive legal prejudice, Cassady also
argues that he had to expend considerable time and money to
educate his attorney to defend him in preparation for a trial in
the District Court. Cassady further points out that the threat to
his livelihood “likely will be outstanding . . . in excess of two
12

Of course, RWLS filed a similar motion but we are not
considering it in our analysis.
13

Notwithstanding Cassady’s expectations, even if we disregard
the possibility of a resolution of this case on a summary
judgment motion, in which event there will not be a trial in this
case, we can see two possible reasons why this case might not
be resolved by a jury: (1) as a matter of law the District Court
might hold that there is no right to a jury trial inasmuch as Gray
in its complaint primarily was seeking injunctive relief; and (2)
the District Court might rule that Cassady waived its right to a
jury trial in its agreement with Gray. We have no need to
address those possibilities now.
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years—far longer than necessary if Gray Holdco had remained
committed to its originally selected forum . . . .” Appellee’s br.
at 45. We agree that the time and expense that Cassady incurred
in opposing Gray’s suit and the resulting delay weigh in favor of
finding waiver.
In reaching our conclusion, we have no doubt that
Cassady has expended considerable resources in defending
against Gray’s lawsuit. Even setting aside the discovery during
the preliminary injunction phase of the litigation, Cassady has
had to retain counsel to represent him in this litigation for
several months. While Gray argues that after the District Court
denied its application for a preliminary injunction the case was
“dormant” and there was “literally no activity going on,”
(appellant’s br. at 27-28) a review of the record demonstrates
that this characterization is inaccurate. As we have discussed,
the District Court held three status conferences, and the parties
filed a Rule 26(f) discovery report and attended a court ordered
mediation hearing. At all of these proceedings the clock on
Cassady’s legal bill undoubtedly was running and, as Cassady
points out, should the dispute proceed to arbitration under the
New Hire Stock Option Plan he will be responsible for one-half
of the professional fees and costs of the arbitrators. App. at 71.
Thus, we cannot ignore the legal expenses Cassady incurred
while Gray sat on its arbitration rights, expenses which would be
compounded if the District Court did not enjoin the Delaware
arbitration. See, e.g., Cotton v. Slone, 4 F.3d 176, 180 (2d Cir.
1993) (“Slone’s conduct has imposed unnecessary expense and
delay on Cotton, which would be compounded if she were now
required to arbitrate her claim.”).
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Second, Cassady makes a compelling argument that
Gray’s claims, which present a substantial threat to his
livelihood, now have been outstanding for over two years
(including during this appeal) due to Gray’s delay in invoking
the arbitration clause. When Gray filed its motion to arbitrate,
the end of discovery was in sight and the parties would have
been ready to file dispositive motions or to proceed to trial. If
the District Court had granted Gray’s motion to compel
arbitration, the proceedings would have started again in a
different forum, requiring the parties, at least to some degree, to
duplicate the efforts they expended in the District Court and thus
frustrating the fundamental purposes underlying arbitration:
[A]rbitration is meant to streamline the
proceedings, lower costs, and conserve private
and judicial resources, and it furthers none of
those purposes when a party actively litigates a
case for an extended period only to belatedly
assert that the dispute should have been arbitrated,
not litigated, in the first place.
Nino, 609 F.3d at 209.
Due to Gray’s delay in invoking the arbitration clause,
this proceeding has not conserved private or judicial resources
and it has been anything but streamlined. We thus agree that
Gray’s failure to notify Cassady of its intent to arbitrate weighs
heavily in favor of finding waiver.
E.

Extent of Non-Merits Motion Practice
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The District Court found that there had not been
significant non-merits motion practice between Gray and
Cassady and, therefore, this factor weighed against finding a
waiver of Gray’s right to arbitrate. Neither Gray nor Cassady
argues that the District Court erred in its analysis of this factor
and, therefore, we adopt the District Court’s finding that this
factor counsels against finding that Gray waived its right to
arbitrate.
F.

Gray’s Acquiescence to Pre-Trial Orders

The fifth Hoxworth factor asks to what extent a party
“assent[ed] to the district court’s pretrial orders.” 980 F.2d at
927. The District Court found that Gray assented to its orders
because it attended three status conferences, filed a Rule 26(f)
discovery report, attended a court-ordered mediation, established
discovery deadlines, including time limits for experts’ reports
and depositions, and then, eight days prior to filing for
arbitration, requested and received extensions of time to
complete discovery. Furthermore, Gray does not contend that it
objected to participating in any of these proceedings. Gray
argues that the District Court’s holding ignores the circumstance
that there would have been status conferences regardless of
when Gray filed its motion to compel arbitration because the
litigation in the District Court would have continued against
RWLS even if there was arbitration of the dispute between Gray
and Cassady. Gray contends, moreover, that the status
conferences did not prejudice Cassady inasmuch as there was no
discovery between the time of the preliminary injunction hearing
and the time when Gray filed its Motion to Stay the Proceedings.
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We agree with the District Court that Gray, through its
assent to its orders, acted inconsistently with an intent to
arbitrate. Gray compares this case with Nino in which we found
that the defendant waived the right to arbitrate where he actively
litigated the case for more than 15 months and engaged in “no
fewer than ten pretrial conferences,” and “extensive discovery.”
Nino, 609 F.3d at 199. However, in Nino we also stated that a
“case-specific waiver analysis is not susceptible to precise linedrawing.” Id. at 212. Thus, Nino does not establish a base line
of what must be shown for acquiescence in pre-trial orders to
waive the right to arbitrate.
Here, in addition to the three pre-trial conferences, the
parties at the District Court’s direction, engaged in mediation
and filed Rule 26(f) discovery reports. Gray at no point during
any of these proceedings indicated that it intended to invoke the
arbitration clause. Further, the absence of discovery between
the proceedings on the preliminary injunction application and
the motion to stay the arbitration does not alleviate the litigation
expenses, which we discussed above, that Cassady incurred by
participating in status conferences, the mediation, and the filing
of a discovery report. In that regard, Gray’s argument that there
would have been status conferences even if there had been
arbitration because the litigation would have continued after the
preliminary injunction hearing does not address the prejudice
Cassady suffered inasmuch as Cassady and RWLS are separate
entities represented by different attorneys in the District Court
litigation. Thus, though the judicial proceedings may have
continued following the denial of the preliminary injunction
application, even if the Gray-Cassady dispute had been
arbitrated, Cassady would not have needed to participate in
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them. Considering the factors that we have set forth we find
that Gray’s acquiescence to the District Court’s pre-trial orders
weighs heavily in favor of finding that Gray waived its right to
arbitrate this dispute.
G.

Extent to Which Both Parties Engaged in
Discovery

The final Hoxworth factor focuses on the amount and
scope of discovery in which the parties engaged prior to the
request for arbitration. The District Court found that while the
parties’ engaged in discovery during the preliminary injunction
proceedings which was closely related to the merits of the
underlying dispute, the arbitration clause authorized the parties
to seek preliminary relief without jeopardizing their arbitration
rights. Thus, inasmuch as the parties did not engage in any
discovery after the preliminary injunction hearing, the District
Court held that the last factor neither weighed in favor nor
against finding a waiver of Gray’s right to arbitrate.
Gray argues that the lack of extensive discovery in this
case should be a “powerful factor supporting enforcement of the
arbitration provision in this case.” Appellant’s br. at 31.
However, like the District Court, we are not prepared to
discount completely the preliminary injunction discovery which,
in this case, was quite extensive: the parties took the depositions
of eight separate individuals; exchanged extensive written
discovery responses, including 200 separate interrogatories,
requests for admission and written document production
requests; the parties exchanged more than 20,000 pages of
documents and submitted to the District Court approximately
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100 pages of Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law. 14 Further, as the District Court held, the discovery was
closely related to the merits of the dispute. Overall, even
considering the lack of further discovery after the preliminary
injunction hearing, we agree with the District Court that the
absence of such discovery, considered from Gray’s viewpoint, at
best is a neutral factor in a waiver analysis.

V.

CONCLUSION

In sum, we find that four of the Hoxworth factors weigh
in favor of finding that Gray waived its right to arbitrate, one
factor is neutral and one factor weighs in favor of finding that
Gray did not waive its right to arbitrate. Moreover, it is clear
that Cassady has suffered prejudice as a result of Gray’s delay in
invoking the arbitration clause. If the arbitration goes ahead, the
substantial time and expense that Cassady spent litigating the
case in the District Court will to some degree need to be
duplicated in the arbitration despite the fact that the dispute was
close to proceeding to trial in the forum that Gray itself choose.
Moreover, we think that the overall circumstances of this
14

Gray argues that Cassady served the majority of the document
requests and took a majority of the depositions during the
preliminary injunction proceedings. In considering the sixth
Hoxworth factor, however, we look at “the extent to which both
parties have engaged in discovery.” Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 927
(emphasis added) (citing Gavlik, 526 F.2d at 783).
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case indicate that Gray, through its litigation conduct, has
waived its right to arbitrate. From the beginning of this dispute,
when Gray initiated the lawsuit without mentioning the
arbitration provision in the New Hire Stock Option Plan to its
compliance without objection to the District Court’s various
orders for ten months and its participation in extensive discovery
and status conferences, Gray indicated, through its conduct, that
it was choosing to litigate its dispute with Cassady. It changed
its strategy from pursuing litigation to demanding arbitration
only after it substituted attorneys, and it did so without any
advanced notification to Cassady. In the meantime, Cassady had
prepared its litigation strategy in anticipation of a trial in the
District Court, and in that preparation participated in the
significant proceedings that we have described and thus incurred
expenses that would not have been necessary if this case is
arbitrated. Considering all that has transpired, whether we
weigh the Hoxworth factors qualitatively or quantitatively, we
agree with the District Court that Gray waived its right to
enforce the arbitration provision contained in the New Hire
Stock Option Plan. 15 Accordingly, we will affirm the District
Court’s orders granting Cassady’s motion to enjoin the
Delaware arbitration and denying Gray’s request to stay the
judicial proceedings pending arbitration.

15

As an alternative argument for affirming the District Court’s
order to enjoin the arbitration, Cassady argues that the
arbitration clause is unenforceable. Inasmuch as we are
affirming the District Court’s orders denying arbitration on a
waiver basis, we need not address this argument.
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